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We comment on the article by C.R. Snyder and T.R. Elliott, “Twenty-First
Century Graduate Education in Clinical Psychology: A Four Level Matrix
Model” (this issue, pp. 1033–1054). We agree with many of the specific
sentiments expressed by these authors but not with their dismissal of the
Boulder model. We conclude that the Boulder model is as valuable today
as when first articulated and that it provides a sturdy foundation upon
which to make the sorts of changes the authors suggest. © 2005 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. J Clin Psychol 61: 1147–1150, 2005.
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Snyder and Elliott (this issue, pp. 1033–1054) criticized the Boulder model for graduate
education in clinical psychology in the United States and went on to propose their own
model of clinical training, one that emphasizes human strengths as well as problems and
requires four levels of analysis: individual, interpersonal, institutional, and societal–
community. Many topics relevant to clinical psychology education—from prescription
privileges through the feminization of the field—are discussed.
We agree with many of specific sentiments expressed by Snyder and Elliott and find
their “four level matrix model” potentially useful in thinking about curriculum revision.
However, we take issue with their dismissal of the Boulder model. Here we revisit the
original position statement that articulated this model and find it is as valuable today as it
was half a century ago. In fact, the Boulder model seems to be an ideal foundation from
which to implement many of the specific recommendations made by Snyder and Elliott.
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For some perspective, let us briefly review the history of clinical psychology in the
US (Reisman, 1976). The demands of World War II profoundly changed—indeed, virtu-
ally created—the field. With an unprecedented proportion of the adult male population
serving in the armed forces and experiencing the stresses of modern war, the need for
acute clinical services outpaced what could be provided by available psychiatrists. Psy-
chologists, heretofore involved in clinical work mainly as testers, were called upon to
provide treatment. What resulted was a generation of basic scientists who through neces-
sity became practitioners.
The immediate aftermath of World War II saw no reduction in the need for clinical
services. Accordingly, the new generation of scientist–practitioner psychologists consol-
idated, formalized, and eventually institutionalized an identity and a profession, encour-
aged and supported by the U.S. federal government. The National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) was created to support research into disorders and their treatment, and
stipends for graduate training programs in clinical psychology were part of the NIMH
portfolio. The Veterans Administration (VA) provided clinical psychology internships for
students in these programs. The VA suggested that the American Psychological Associ-
ation (APA) regularize the training of would-be clinical psychologists. The APA accord-
ingly proposed guidelines for the accreditation of professional psychology programs and
lobbied state governments to enact laws that specified the credentials of those who could
call themselves a “psychologist” and provide clinical services for fee.
The Shakow Report on graduate training in clinical psychology was issued by the
APA in 1947 and was followed shortly by the 1949 conference in Colorado—a 14-day
meeting sponsored by the APA and funded by NIMH—from which the Boulder model
recommendations emanated (Raimy, 1950). Like the Snyder and Elliott statement, the
Boulder vision ranged from the specific to the general, but here are the largest emphases:
• The foundation of professional psychology is scientific psychology, and those who
are to be professional psychologists must be fully trained as scientific psycholo-
gists; they must be more than consumers of scientific knowledge—they must also
know how to produce it themselves.
• The appropriate level of educational attainment is therefore the doctorate, the cap-
stone of which is a formal dissertation based on original research.
• Academic coursework and practical experiences should be melded throughout grad-
uate training, along with research activities.
We do not dispute that the Boulder model is enacted inconsistently or that APA
accreditation guidelines and state laws may encourage “teaching to the test” by providing
a checklist of requirements to be satisfied. We still think that the Boulder model in its
general thrust remains of great value to the individual psychologist as well as to the larger
society. An emphasis on scientific training allows the psychologist to contribute to what
is known as well as to make sense of current theories and research findings. An emphasis
on practice allows the psychologist to apply tentative science within the fog of the real
world. If science and practice are too separate (Stricker, 1992), that is not a problem with
the Boulder model but with how it has been implemented during and after graduate
training. Rather than replacing the Boulder model with alternative visions, we think our
efforts should be directed at fixing it.
It is worth considering why the Boulder model has been as successful as it has. Over
the years, countless conferences have issued manifestos, white papers, and policy state-
ments that today only gather dust. Why is the Boulder model different? One reason is that
it described what many psychologists were already doing. It summarized the sustained
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actions of an entire generation of psychologists. The power of the Boulder model was to
put a name to these collective actions. Once named, professional psychology could then
be shaped and directed, even if some of the results have been less than ideal.
An important theme of the 1949 Colorado conference was a spirit of experimenta-
tion. The conference participants expected the face of clinical psychology to change
and thus recommended that graduate education be broad and flexible enough to allow
change to be accommodated (Raimy, 1950). Consider that many of the specific recom-
mendations by Snyder and Elliott reflect current developments within psychology and
require precisely the skills of a well-trained scientist–practitioner to perfect, to sustain,
and—someday—to abandon as new developments occur. One of the reasons that the
Boulder model stressed a scientific attitude was the belief that not enough was known
circa 1949 to define a fixed body of knowledge; professional psychologists were there-
fore needed to add to what was known. At the present time, perhaps too much is known,
not all of it especially useful, and a scientific (skeptical, critical, empirical, and tenta-
tive) attitude is even more necessary, as is hands-on experience with how to implement
the best of this knowledge.
Snyder and Elliott called for more attention to the biochemical bases of behavior, to
physical health and illness, to strategies of prevention, to children and the elderly, and to
ethnic minorities. These are all thriving areas of scientific research within psychology
and allied disciplines. Snyder and Elliott also called for more recognition of how these
topics are embedded in multiple social contexts—this is already a strong emphasis of
current school-based and community-based practice. We are a bit puzzled that Snyder
and Elliott did not acknowledge more than they did the existence of well-established
graduate programs that variously specialize in clinical neuropsychology, health psychol-
ogy, child clinical psychology, developmental psychopathology, community psychology,
and so on. Such programs are not unusual; neither are practicum placements and intern-
ships in a variety of settings besides VA Medical Centers.
Perhaps these current realities, even if not sufficiently acknowledged by Snyder and
Elliott, bode well for their vision. If their model is to have an impact, it will be because a
critical mass of professional psychologists is already doing those things to which their
model puts a name. If the field of clinical psychology discovers that it has “been speaking
prose all along,” then the four level matrix model will be useful. We do not think that it
will replace the Boulder model, but it may flesh out its curricular manifestation in the
near future, just as the APA guidelines for accreditation try to flesh out the current state of
general psychology in terms of history and systems, measurement, methodology, statis-
tics, and the biological, cognitive/affective, developmental, and social aspects of behavior.
The quadrants and levels of Snyder and Elliott’s model encompass currently impor-
tant emphases of psychology that should be addressed in graduate education. However,
these important emphases all come to bear on the same behavioral phenomena; they
should not be automatically transformed into 4, 8, or 16 different courses. This would
repeat the charade of meeting APA guidelines with an array of appropriately named
courses rather than using these guidelines to judge the adequacy of each and every course
in a curriculum.
In calling for greater attention by professional psychologists to people’s strengths,
Snyder and Elliott echoed an emphasis currently evident in a variety of approaches to
science and practice: e.g., assets-based community development, character education,
competence-based primary prevention, the cultural strengths perspective, life coaching,
positive organizational studies, positive psychology, positive youth development, strengths-
based social work, and the whole-school reform movement. These approaches share with
Snyder and Elliott the assumption that a sole emphasis by psychologists on disease and
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distress is incomplete and that psychology should direct as much of its effort to encour-
aging what is good in life as it has to remedying what is bad.
We could not agree more, and our own recent work has been concerned with positive
traits and their association with well-being (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, in press). We
mention some of what we have learned from our efforts to understand strengths of char-
acter such as curiosity, teamwork, and hope, because these lessons raise some cautions
about the details of Snyder and Elliott’s proposed model.
Character strengths ostensibly fit within quadrant #1 (Snyder & Elliott, this issue,
p. 1034) of their model but upon closer examination cross all the lines and splay over all
the levels. Nowhere did Snyder and Elliott say that their scheme neatly segregates its
entries—indeed, they describe the quadrants as pertaining to features of the person and
of the environment—but we would like to stress that such a simple visual depiction may
still be misleading. For example, we have learned that almost everyone is best described
with a profile of greater and lesser strengths (weaknesses)—i.e., in terms of quadrants #1
and #3 (this issue, p. 1034). Furthermore, strengths often co-occur with psychological
problems and may even result from their successful resolution. Finally, even obvious
strengths of character like kindness and humor have a downside if displayed at the wrong
time or in the wrong place.
Strengths of character do not exist in isolation from the social setting in which a
person is to be found, and they are importantly influenced by interpersonal, institutional,
and societal factors. However, it proves difficult to say where one influence ends and
another begins. At the same time, sometimes strengths are displayed against the grain of
these extra-individual influences, and these instances demand special attention. We have
also found it difficult to carve up environments or even features of environments as
“positive” or “negative” in terms of their invariant impact on character strengths. Accord-
ingly, the line between quadrants #2 and #4 should be blurred if not altogether erased
(this issue, p. 1034).
In conclusion, we concur with Snyder and Elliott that the APA accreditation process
(and state certification/licensure laws) become more flexible and allow graduate educa-
tion to reflect what the very best scientist–practitioners are currently doing. Those who
bequeathed to us the Boulder model would certainly approve.
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